Abstract-In this article, we present an economical analysis of the integration of purely electrical vehicles (EV) in the smart grid energy market using tools from mean field game theory. Our main contribution consist in a formal description of the mean field equilibrium of the resulting competitive interaction when EV owners buy and sell electricity from their cars, selfishly but rationally, based on collective price incentives. We present a comprehensive set of numerical results, which allows a consistent analysis of the evolution of the price of electricity, of the timely demand, and possibly of the energy reserves in the grid
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized [1] , [2] , [3] that the future intense penetration of electrical vehicles (EV) in the energy market will generate an important additional energy demand, and therefore a new strain to the electricity suppliers. At the same time, EV owners are not only energy consumers as EVs can charge as well as discharge their battery contents from or to the electrical grid. From this perspective, these vehicles can be seen as an additional large dimensional energy buffer to flatten the peaky daily and seasonal energy demands. That is, EVs can connect to the smart grid and sell their energy surpluses, when needed. It is therefore an important economical and social challenge to enforce charge and discharge policies to EVs in an optimal manner [4] . As shown in [4] , [5] , [6] , optimality must be interpreted in the sense of maximum individual revenue obtained by the EV owners when participating in the energy trades, as well as maximum performance of the electricity grid, e.g. low probability for blackouts, large energy reserves, etc. The price at which the energy is sold or bought depends obviously on the total demand and offer of all electrical vehicles present in the network (and also on the existing energy consumption by ancillary services in the grid). The electricity price is set by the energy market, and we therefore assume the existence of communications between EVs and the grid. Relevant important aspects of EV-to-grid communication protocols can be found in e.g. [7] , [8] , [9] . Since each EV action impacts the satisfaction of all other EVs, it impacts the next actions of the latter in return, all of them being therefore in competition.
This competitive interaction in which each vehicle owner decides the amount of energy to be sold or bought at any time given a global price can be analyzed using tools from dynamic game theory [10] . For instance, in [11] , the coexistence of a number of PHEV groups aiming to sell part of their stored energy to the smart grid are studied using non-cooperative game theory. The authors propose in particular an algorithm based on best response dynamics to allow PHEV groups to reach a Nash equilibrium point [12] . Nonetheless, in practical scenarios, the number of vehicles is extremely large and, thus, elements from classical game theory are difficult to handle and in general do not bring enough insight about the global behavior of the market.
To overcome this problem, in this paper, we study the energy trade when the number of vehicles tends to infinity and all vehicles can be considered identical (indistinguishability principle). Within this framework, we model the game as a mean field game [13] , [14] . In contrast to N -player games, where each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N } follows the evolution of the state of the game and the actions taken by all other players in order to maximize a given individual benefit, in the mean field game formulation, every players action is driven by the collective (or mean) behavior of all players and not by the individual actions of each other player. As a main consequence, it is possible in these games to follow the state trajectory of all players at once and to capture the behavior of the players depending only on (i) their initial state X 0 and (ii) the joint distribution m (0, ·), at time t = 0. The notion of Nash equilibrium in the context of mean field games is extended to the notion of mean field equilibrium (MFE). A mean field equilibrium that satisfies some regularity conditions can be found as a fixed point solution to a coupled system of stochastic partial differential equations [13] , [14] which includes a (backward) Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and a (forward) Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation. The HJB equation determines the optimal feedback controls α t = α t (X t ), or actions, of the players (the EV owners) in state X t at time t, while the FPK equation determines the distribution m generated by the controls α t .
In [15] , a mean field game approach to the study of oil production in unlimited time is developed where the selfish players are oil producers and the mean field variable is the oil selling price. In this article, we develop a similar framework to [15] but on a finite time horizon, applied to both EVs, with vehicle owners as the selfish players and electricity price as the mean field variable of interest. The mean-field property relates presently to the fact that every player's action is driven not by the individual actions of each other player but by the collective (or mean) behavior of all players. Indeed, we will assume that the price for electricity is driven both by the smart grid which may enforce policies at specific time instants but 2 more importantly by the total amount of energy bought at time t by the players. The state evolution under study will be here the evolution of the quantity X t of electricity in the battery of the EV owners. This state is controlled by the quantity α t (X t ) of electricity bought or sold by players in state X t , at time t. This mean field formulation suggests that energy is depleted or filled continuously in the batteries of EV owners. This is justified as we now remind that consumers are not treated as individuals but as a continuum. That is, we may consider that players approximately in any state X t = X around time t in reality buy or sell energy in bursts but that the entire population buys and sells electricity ccontinuously on average.
The reminder of this article unfolds as follows. In Section II, we introduce the mean field game model for the electrical vehicle problem under consideration. In Section III, we develop the fundamental equations describing a MFE of the system under study. In Section IV, we present some numerical examples and derive conclusions. Finally, in Section V, we conclude this work.
Notations: + stands for max(x, 0). The function δ A is the indicator function on the set A.
II. MODEL
In this section, we present both the classical game formulation and the mean field game formulation of the competitive interaction between the EV presented above. In the former, we consider a finite set of players, and in the latter, we consider a set of players which can be approximated by a continuum.
A. N -player Game Formulation
Consider the game to be played by N electrical vehicle owners who decide at all time on the optimal battery level given a utility function encompassing three parameters: (i) the economical cost or gain of filling or emptying the battery; (ii) the (psychological) cost of operating on the battery at certain time instants of the day; and (iii) the disutility for the user to have a nearly empty battery.
For player i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, we denote X (i) t ∈ [0, 1] its state variable, corresponding to its battery level at time t ∈ [0, T ]. We assume that player i modifies X t dt, at time t. We also assume that player i consumes a quantity g
t dt of energy at time t. We therefore have the state evolution for each player given by the equation
where we restrict α
and g
for all t and is uniquely defined.
The objective for player i is to minimize the cost
for an initial vector state
) over the time window [0, T ]. Such optimization takes place by controlling the parameter
, where we denoted α
) the controls of all players but i at time t. The term p t ( − → α t ) is the price of electricity (identical for all players) given the instantaneous energy joint demand − → α t = (α
) (we assume that both buying and selling prices are equal); h i (t, α) is the psychological cost for player i to perform a change αdt in the battery level at time t (some time periods are more appropriate than others to purchase or sell energy depending on the player's routine); f i (t, X) is the cost for player i to be in state X at time t (typically, one does not wish to have a low battery level in certain periods of time); and k i (X) is the (terminal) cost of being at state X at time T (this avoids the undesirable effect that all energy is sold in the last instants of [0, T ]). Details on specific choices for these functions are provided later.
In game theory, this formulation is known as an N -player continuous-time differential game of pre-specified fixed duration T [10] . The notion of Nash equilibrium in this game corresponds to the state from which no player has any interest of unilateral deviation [12] , [16] , assuming some available strategies for the players. Here we are interested in ownstate feedback strategies, i.e. we assume that the action α (i) t of player i at time t depends on the initial state − → X 0 of all players and on its current state X (i) t . The own-state feedback Nash equilibrium for the game is then given by the controls
for each i and for any admissible own-state feedback control − → α . The cost (at equilibrium) for player i will be simply
). The interest of Nash equilibria in the EV interaction lies in the fact that, at such state, all the EVs are using a control policy from which they will not deviate. However, finding the Nash equilibrium of a game where N is even a not-solarge number boils down to solving a large system of joint differential equations, which is a numerically intense problem. It is indeed clear that, under this formulation, any change in the battery level of a given player impacts all other players which must react as a consequence.
B. Mean Field Formulation
In this subsection, we will consider a simplification of the game described above. Such simplification is obtained by assuming the limit as N grows large. The foundations of this approach were established in [17] ; see also [18] for recent results. Within this framework, instead of considering the vector (X
) of state spaces at time t, we consider a random variable X t with distribution m t (X t ) = m(t, X t ) at time t defined as the weak limit of the empirical distribution
We assume that all conditions are met for such a limit to be well-defined (in particular, arguments of asymptotic player indistinguishability justify the existence of a limit, see [19] ).
Since it would be inappropriate to require that all individual players consume exactly the same amount of electricity per time instant, we consider instead that the energy consumption is a random variable with mean g t dt, modeled as the variable
where W t is a Brownian motion and the differential notation dW t must be interpreted in the sense of Itô [20] . This choice on W ensures that the additive noise in the ODE (1), denoted by σ t ξ t , satisfies that:
+ , ξ t1 and ξ t2 are independent; {ξ t } is stationary, and ∀t ∈ R + , E [ξ t ] = 0. All cost functions are supposed identical for all players, so we substitute in particular the functions h, k and f to h i , k i and f i , respectively, and denote p t (m(t, ·)) the price of electricity given the distribution m(t, ·) at time t.
The objective for any given user is to solve the following problem
where m t = m(t, ·) is the distribution induced by α t , given an initial state X 0 following the distribution m 0 , according to (6) , dS t is a reflective variable to ensure that X t remains in [0, 1], and where the admissible α t are such that α t is X t -adapted for all t. As in the finite N scenario, we restrict α t and g t to be such that X t is uniquely defined [21] , and we impose that C and k are measurable functions. We define C explicitly as
It would be natural to consider that the price p t (m t ) writes as a function of the total instantaneous demand α t (X)m(t, dX). However, for computational ease, we will instead consider that prices are fixed not by the total consumption α t (X)m(t, dX) but by the total expected consumption
Xm(t, dX) , where both quantities only differ by an additional Brownian motion term when σ t > 0. That is, we assume that the price is set a priori based on the expected instantaneous demand at time t rather than on the actual demand, and therefore can be precomputed at time t = 0.
We therefore define p t as
where D(t, p) is the total energy demand function at time t for a given price p. For the moment, we do not impose any closed form to the function D, in order to keep our analysis sufficiently general. This function is central to create incentive behavior among players. For instance, at peak demand periods for electricity services other than EVs, p t may be increased for negative EV electricity demand and decreased for positive EV electricity demand so to enforce car owners to sell rather than to buy electricity. This fluid limit formulation now defines a mean field game, as introduced in [13] , [14] . We still focus here on determining own-state feedback strategies (α t ) t , i.e. strategies such that, at time t, α t depends on X t .
Our specific problem setting is as such very close to the work [15] . In this framework, the solutions to the problem (5) can be seen as generalizations of Nash equilibria [12] in the equivalent N -person game. It is in general difficult to prove that the mean field solutions are well-defined limits of the Nperson game, see e.g. the discussions in [22] . Similarly, it is in general difficult to prove the existence and uniqueness of solutions to (5) and, if so, to derive a numerical method that is provably converging to the solution as the discretization step tends to zero, see e.g. [23] .
III. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we analyze the mean field game described in the previous section. In this context, the notion of Nash equilibrium introduced previously is replaced by the notion of MFE, which, for a particular class of regular solutions, is a corollary of the definition in [13] , [14] which we exploit here.
The MFE is obtained here as the feedback control associated with the solution to a coupled system of stochastic partial differential equations constituted by a backward HJB equation and a forward FPK equation. In this section, we detail these fundamental equations.
Consider the problem of Section II, and define the function
For a given initial distribution m 0 (or equivalently for an initial random variable X 0 ), an admissible control α = {α t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T }, which induces a mean field trajectory m = {m t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T }, is a MFE in own-state feedback strategies if, for all admissible control α = {α t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T }, which induces a mean field trajectory m = {m t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T }, it holds that
where, v(0, X 0 ; α) and v(0, X 0 ; α ) are evaluated with respect to the trajectories m and m , respectively. Define now the value function
(11) where the state at time u, X u , is restricted to satisfy X u = X in distribution. In particular, for u = 0, v(u, X) is the cost when the game is initiated at X 0 = X in distribution.
The MFE α t must be a solution to the following (backward) HJB equation
where m t = m(t, ·) is the trajectory of the mean field at time t induced by the control policy α t . Thus, m t is the solution to the following (forward) FPK equation,
for a given initial distribution m 0 . Details of how these equations are obtained can be found in e.g. [21] .
We assume here that the cost h(t, α) for control is quadratic and reads
with h t > 0 representing the unwillingness of the car owner to buy or sell energy at time t. This choice is seemingly non-natural as it implies that users are more willing to buy or sell small quantities rather than large quantities of energy. Nonetheless, under the mean field game formulation, this has to be understood as the fact that, on average, only a limited population of users at time t is willing (or able) to buy energy. For instance, during nighttime, many EVs are plugged to an electrical source so that h t is smaller at night (more users can ask for energy). As such, intuitively, making the (psychological) cost of buying or selling energy larger for larger amounts of energy forces only part of the population to buy or sell. As for the particular choice of a quadratic cost rather than any other cost function, it is convenient for calculation mostly. Under these conditions, by convexity arguments, we immediately have an expression of the optimal own-state feedback control α t for a state X at time t as the argument of
Precisely, we have
, possibly submitted to some boundary conditions to ensure that X t ∈ [0, 1] at all times. In the remainder of the article, we assume this condition is always met, so that at no time we will consider no class of EV owners with completely full or completely empty batteries.
The HJB equation now becomes
which can be simplified as
and the FPK equation is
This defines the two fundamental differential equations to be solved for the optimal EV policy.
In all generality, we cannot go further with the resolution of these equations which need to be solved numerically. This is the target of the next section in which simulation results are provided.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we assume a realistic three-day scenario (t = 0 at midnight the first day and t = 1 seventy-two hours later) where players have an average consumption rate that depends on specific periods of the days. The scenario is typical of a Friday to Sunday energy consumption, with higher overall electricity consumption on Friday and different patterns of car usage on Friday than on Saturday and Sunday. Since it is difficult to provide a universal system parametrization, we will take arbitrary scalings in the energy consumption functions. Some insights on the impact of different scalings will be provided.
The car electricity consumption function g t is depicted in Figure 1 , where we see in particular that consumption is higher on Friday and with a peak around 5pm, while consumption is lower on weekend days with different peak times. The variance σ 2 t on the consumption is taken equal to 0.01 at all time, ensuring a standard deviation of the order of 10%. The demand function D(t, p) is such that the price p is a quadratic function of the total electricity demand from both electrical vehicles and other electricity services. Specifically, we take here
where d t stands for the demand of electricity in services other than electrical cars. We therefore assume that this demand is deterministic and is not altered by price evolution, which is unrealistic to some extent but helps appreciating the impact of EV consumption on prices. The function d t is depicted in dashed line in Figure 4 , up to a constant corresponding to the total average EV consumption; that is, the dashed line represents the total electricity consumption if EV consumption were distributed equally in time. For simplicity of understanding, we assume h t = 30 constant; that is, we do not consider that the car owners have any particular incentive to charge or discharge at some specific time periods. 1 We take f (t, X) = (1 − X) 2 to impose consumers to keep a certain level of electricity in their batteries, and the boundary condition v(1, X) = (1 − X) 2 in order to avoid large sales at the last minute. To solve the system of equations in (m, v), we proceed by solving sequentially the HJB and FPK equations using a simple fixed-point algorithm until convergence. Using a finite 1 Note that the determination of a correct ht is highly subjective and is better kept constant for the sake of interpretation.
difference method on a sampling of 144 points in the time axis (every 30min) and of 100 points in the battery level axis, the above scheme leads to the distribution evolution m depicted in Figure 2 . A few observations can be already made from this figure. We easily observe daily sequences of increases and decreases of the average battery levels. We see in particular that during nighttime, the battery levels increase, indicating that energy is purchased at time and consumed during daytime. It is interesting to note that, due to the small variance σ 2 t that was chosen, the overall tendency is for m (t, ·) to concentrate into a single mass when t → 1. This is a usual phenomenon which determines the steady state if time were to continue with constant values for all time-dependent system parameters.
From the expression of m , v , and the equations derived in Section III, it is now possible to obtain much information about the system. In particular, it is interesting to follow the electricity bought or sold by electrical vehicles at all time, that is the quantity
or the overall electricity consumption in the market given by
and the price p t (m t ) defined here as
This is depicted in Figure 3 , Figure 4 and in Figure 5 , respectively. We see first in Figure 3 that the peaks of electricity bought by electrical vehicles take place during the night where the overall demand is low, while they are at their lowest during peak demand periods. This is a natural outcome of the fact that prices are high during peak demand periods. However, we also see that the difference of amplitude between lowest and highest purchases is not large. This is due to the fact that, while prices are high in peak demand periods, the EV owners still have a strong incentive not to find their batteries empty, driving them to keep buying electricity at peak periods. This behaviour can be hindered by relaxing the constraint f (t, X).
Of more interest is Figure 4 , where the differences between electricity consumption with or without incentives on EV behaviour. This figure depicts in dashed line the overall energy consumption if the EV purchases were equally distributed in the three-day period (that is, with no incentive), and in plain line the overall consumption under our current assumptions. It is seen here that the price incentives on electricity purchases produces a much expected peak demand reduction in the critical day periods, and a simultaneous increase of consumption during low consumption periods. Note importantly that our analysis does not consider changes in d t based on different pricing; only the part of electricity reserved for EV drives prices which in turn drive the EV behaviour, which is a natural assumption if different pricing strategies are applied to EV and other services. The price evolution is depicted in Figure  5 , where it is seen in this setting that the price is mostly driven by the function d t . 
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we proposed a game theoretical framework to model the behavior of electrical vehicle owners aiming at selfishly maximizing their benefit, under electricity pricing policy constraints. As the number of selfish players is large, players are alike, and the pricing policy depends on the action of all participants, we then turned the problem into a mean field game, for which we obtain the differential equations ruling the regular solutions. Numerical examples were shown to give new insights on the way to optimize the electrical vehicle penetration in the smart grid. Even thought insightful results were obtained with this model, further work is required to make it more realistic. For instance, the assumption of indistinguishability between the EV must be soften. Similarly, it is of paramount interest, despite the complexity involved, to compare the asymptotical results obtained with the mean field game theoretic approach, with the results obtained from classical game theory, where a finite number of players is considered.
